Turkey Is Building the Military Network Iran Could Never Assemble

This analysis examines Turkey’s ambitious regional military strategy as demonstrated at the EFES-2026 exercise. By hosting troops from across North Africa and the Levant—including previously fractured Libyan factions and Syria’s newly reconstituted army—Ankara is moving beyond the proxy-based influence models of the past. We explore how Turkey is leveraging its institutional legitimacy and NATO status to formalize a durable military network, effectively creating a new strategic reality in the Middle East that challenges Israeli security planning and reshapes the regional balance of power.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan walking through a crowded assembly hall.

The flags told the story before a single press release did. At Turkey’s EFES-2026 combined military exercise near Izmir last week, fifty nations gathered along the Aegean coast in one of Ankara’s most ambitious multilateral displays to date. Two of those flags had never appeared at any foreign military exercise before: Libya’s and Syria’s. Their presence was not symbolic decoration. It was the public face of a military architecture that Turkey has been assembling across the collapsed states of North Africa and the Levant — one that is now sufficiently mature to be demonstrated to fifty audiences simultaneously.

From Tripoli to Damascus: The Architecture Takes Shape

Libya’s participation at EFES-2026 carried a detail that deserves particular attention. The 502 Libyan troops who deployed to the exercise included soldiers from both the country’s internationally recognized western government and the eastern forces aligned with Khalifa Haftar — two rival factions that have never jointly participated in a foreign military drill. Turkish defense officials framed the arrangement as progress toward their stated One Libya, One Army goal. The training curriculum tells you what that goal actually means in operational terms: amphibious warfare, electronic warfare, mine clearance, and special forces tactics. That is not a reconstruction curriculum. It is a force projection curriculum, being delivered to a government that Turkey has bound to itself through a 2019 maritime demarcation agreement that Greece, Egypt, and Israel regard as illegal under international law.

Syria’s inclusion was smaller in numbers and larger in implication. Syrian army units participated in EFES-2026 in the first reported deployment of the country’s reconstituted armed forces to an exercise abroad since Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed in December 2024. Turkey and Syria had formalized a bilateral defense cooperation memorandum in Ankara in August 2025, covering training, consultancy, weapons systems, and logistical support. What EFES-2026 demonstrated is that the memorandum has moved from paper to practice. Syrian soldiers are now training alongside American and German counterparts under the Turkish flag, absorbing a command culture and operational framework that Ankara will shape for years to come.

The Structural Difference From Iran’s Playbook

Turkey’s regional expansion is often framed alongside Iran’s two-decade project of building proxy influence through Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The comparison is superficially convenient but structurally misleading. Iran operated through militias, deniable financing, and ideological networks — channels that carried constant reputational and legal risk and that invited retaliation precisely because of their unofficial character. Turkey operates through defense ministries, signed bilateral memoranda, official training programs, and the institutional legitimacy of NATO membership. When Syria’s army stands alongside the German Bundeswehr in a Turkish-hosted exercise, Ankara secures something Iranian proxy networks could never purchase: the optics of normality and the legitimacy of multilateral participation.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has made Ankara’s strategic intent explicit. In April he warned that Israeli military operations in Syria represent a direct threat to Turkish national security, and accused Netanyahu of seeking to designate Turkey as Israel’s next enemy. These are not the words of a government that views its regional presence as passive or defensive. They reflect a deliberate calculation that Israel’s simultaneous preoccupation with Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran has created a strategic opening — and that Ankara intends to consolidate its position before that opening closes.

Israel’s Exposed Flank

Tel Aviv confronts an adversary that is qualitatively different from anything it has managed before. Turkey has imposed a full trade embargo, closed its airspace to Israeli aircraft, and a Turkish court has opened criminal proceedings against Netanyahu and dozens of Israeli officials. This is institutional hostility, and the military dimension is now deepening in ways that will outlast any single government on either side.

The most consequential question for Israeli defense planners is not what Syria’s army looks like today but what it will look like in three years — who will have trained its officers, what equipment it will carry, and whose strategic doctrine it will have internalized. EFES-2026 marked the formal beginning of that integration. The clock is now running, and Ankara is setting the pace.


Original analysis inspired by Amine Ayoub from Ynetnews. Additional research and verification conducted through multiple sources.

By ThinkTanksMonitor