Washington and Brussels still share the same core goals in the Middle East: prevent nuclear proliferation, avoid regional war, stabilize energy flows, and suppress jihadist networks. But they now pursue those goals with different playbooks, shaped by diverging political cultures, institutional habits, and strategic priorities.
Munich 2026 revealed a continent in transition: spending more, planning further ahead, and finally treating defense as a core function of statehood rather than a budgetary inconvenience. But it also revealed a Europe still psychologically tethered to Washington, even as Washington signals that its patience, priorities, and commitments are no longer what they once were.
For decades, Europe treated American digital infrastructure and financial networks as neutral utilities. That illusion has collapsed. The combination of extraterritorial U.S. laws, sanctions used as administrative weapons, and the growing willingness of Washington to threaten allies has forced European governments to confront a simple truth: dependency equals vulnerability.
Europe is trying to perform an impossible balancing act: signal independence from Washington while relying entirely on American military power to deter threats that Europe cannot handle alone. The Iran crisis exposes this contradiction with unusual clarity. At the very moment when Western unity is strategically essential, Europe is drifting into rhetorical autonomy that it cannot operationalize.
The liberal trade order that defined the post‑1945 world is no longer collapsing suddenly — it is dissolving structurally. The rise of protectionism, especially in the United States, is forcing every major economy to redesign its trade strategy in real time. What emerges is not a new system, but a fragmented landscape of overlapping blocs, bilateral deals, and improvised coalitions.
Europe is entering a moment it has avoided for 75 years: the need to think about its own defense, its own nuclear deterrent, and its own geopolitical identity without assuming the United States will always be there. The postwar order isn’t just fraying — it’s structurally decomposing.
Europe is trying to compete in a world defined by U.S. and Chinese state capacity, but it is doing so with institutions designed for consensus, caution, and inclusivity. The result is a structural contradiction:
Rubio’s Munich speech was designed to sound like a reset in transatlantic relations, but its omissions and ideological framing revealed that the structural rift between Washington and Europe is widening, not closing.
The end of New START has opened the door to unconstrained U.S.–Russia nuclear expansion just as China accelerates its own buildup, creating a volatile three‑way arms race with no verification, no guardrails, and rising risks of miscalculation.
The collapse of New START and China’s rapid nuclear buildup have ended decades of structured restraint, creating an unstable three‑way arms race with no treaties, no verification, and rising risks of miscalculation in a multipolar nuclear world.
Iran’s push to restart Muscat talks reflects domestic turmoil and strategic delay, but clashing agendas, sidelined Europeans, and unresolved trust gaps suggest the negotiations remain a fragile holding pattern rather than a path to a durable nuclear deal.
Western hesitation has prolonged a brutal stalemate in Ukraine, where massive casualties, slow aid, and delayed weapons have strengthened Russia’s attritional strategy while forcing Kyiv to innovate militarily and Europe to rearm unevenly, leaving the war’s outcome tied to political will rather than battlefield shifts.
