Recent fighting in the Middle East has drawn down American stocks of advanced missiles and interceptors at a moment when any clash with China would demand deep reserves. Although US systems performed with notable precision against Iranian targets, the pace of expenditure underscored vulnerabilities that existed long before those operations began. Beijing’s military machine, by contrast, operates on a wartime footing, churning out ships, aircraft, and munitions at a scale that outpaces current US production. These imbalances raise serious doubts about Washington’s ability to deter aggression in the Taiwan Strait or prevail if conflict erupts.
Chinese forces have expanded their reach across air, sea, space, and cyber domains, placing US and allied positions in the first and second island chains under growing threat. Bases in Japan, the Philippines, and Guam sit within easy striking distance of Chinese missiles and drones. Many lack sufficient hardened shelters, dispersed fuel supplies, or layered defenses. A simultaneous crisis in Europe would stretch American resources even thinner, as wargames have repeatedly shown that key munitions could run dry within days of intense fighting.
The Hellscape Strategy
One promising response centers on flooding likely battle zones with large numbers of relatively inexpensive unmanned systems. Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of US Indo-Pacific Command, has spoken of turning the Taiwan Strait into an “unmanned hellscape” to complicate any Chinese crossing and buy precious time. The approach draws directly from Ukraine’s experience, where both sides now produce and expend hundreds of thousands of drones each month for reconnaissance, strikes, and electronic warfare.
Success would require a high-low mix: sophisticated Virginia-class submarines operating alongside cheaper unmanned underwater vehicles, stealthy B-21 bombers paired with swarming attritable drones, and advanced fighters supported by expendable systems. These platforms could lay mines, hunt ships, jam radars, and feed targeting data while limiting risk to crews. Yet current US inventories of such unmanned vehicles remain far below what protracted combat would consume. Taiwan itself needs far more of these tools, along with coastal defense missiles already long delayed in delivery.
Rebuilding the Arsenal
Production timelines present another hard limit. Many critical munitions, from SM-6 interceptors to JASSM cruise missiles and THAAD components, take three to four years from contract to delivery. Factory expansions face regulatory hurdles, skilled labor shortages, and fragile supply chains. Open-source assessments indicate American stockpiles were already insufficient for a major Pacific conflict before recent Middle East operations further reduced them.
Taiwan’s arms backlog, which recently approached $32 billion, compounds the problem. Systems such as Harpoon coastal defenses and advanced surface-to-air missiles have moved slowly despite clear urgency in Taipei. China’s shipyards, meanwhile, launch vessels at a rate several times that of US yards, widening the gap in maritime capacity.
Industrial and Strategic Imperatives
The Trump administration has pushed to expand output, secure critical minerals, and streamline acquisition. Multiyear contracts for munitions and sustained funding for aircraft and ship maintenance represent positive steps. Base hardening in the Indo-Pacific, accelerated development of counter-drone technologies, and a broader national effort to revive defense manufacturing will prove equally vital.
History shows that prolonged great-power contests ultimately favor the side with the stronger industrial foundation. Closing today’s gaps will demand speed, sustained investment, and fresh thinking before deterrence is tested in earnest.
Original analysis inspired by Seth G. Jones from Center for Strategic and International Studies. Additional research and verification conducted through multiple sources.
