When the US and Israel launched joint strikes on Iran on February 28, Tehran did not limit its retaliation to the countries that hit it. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps turned the geography of American power into a target map, striking US bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE — installations including the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, Ali Al Salem in Kuwait, Al Udeid in Qatar, and Al Dhafra in the UAE. By the time the first wave of strikes subsided, the UAE had reported 1,422 drones and 246 missiles fired at its territory. Kuwait recorded 406 drones and 219 missiles. Qatar reported 63 drones, 129 missiles, and two aircraft. Bahrain claimed to have intercepted 164 drones and 95 missiles. None of those countries fired a single shot at Iran.
That detail is the center of gravity in this story. The Gulf states had no part in initiating this conflict, yet they have paid a far larger price than the US. The bases that were supposed to shield them had instead drawn the strike coordinates.
A Bargain That Changed Its Terms
For decades, US bases in the Gulf were seen by regional leaders and publics as guarantees of Washington’s security commitment — deterrents against attack from Iraq, Iran, or any other hostile power. But now, at least some in the Gulf see those same bases as targets drawing them into an unwanted conflict.
That shift is not merely rhetorical. Tehran openly claims it is targeting Gulf neighbors because those countries host American military installations, despite their own lack of direct involvement in combat operations. These states have consistently and categorically prohibited the use of their territories as launchpads for offensive actions against Iran — yet they continue to find themselves at the center of regional escalations simply because of their geographic location and security partnerships.
US military installations in the Gulf are not sovereign American territory. They are host-state territory where foreign forces operate under negotiated legal and political arrangements. That arrangement creates a strategic paradox: bases intended to strengthen deterrence can simultaneously become focal points of retaliation and political controversy during a regional crisis.
The human cost of that paradox is concrete. Downed Iranian drones landed in populated areas of Manama, causing damage to houses, igniting vehicles, and leaving wreckage in residential neighborhoods. An 11-year-old girl sustained injuries in one such incident. Following an attack on its oil refinery complex, Bahrain’s state oil company BAPCO declared force majeure on its group operations. Separately, debris from an Iranian drone strike on an office tower in the Seef District killed a 29-year-old Bahraini woman and injured eight others.
Kuwait’s experience was equally stark. Iranian drones heavily damaged a passenger terminal at Kuwait International Airport, killing one person and wounding dozens, briefly closing the airfield. US Central Command called the attack “deliberate, calculated and unjustified.” India’s embassy confirmed the person killed was an Indian national. Authorities said 63 were wounded, including passengers and workers, some with serious injuries.
The Neutrality That Was Never an Option
Gulf governments tried to thread a needle that may not exist. Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey all publicly stated they would not permit their territory or airspace to be used for an attack on Iran. Fox News and the Wall Street Journal had previously reported that Gulf allies blocked the US from using their bases and airspace for strikes on Iran over fears of Iranian retaliation. That restraint did not protect them.
The presence of Western military bases, alongside logistical and intelligence networks tied to regional security alliances, makes Gulf states — in Iranian calculations — an inherent part of the landscape, even if they do not directly participate in military operations. The US alone maintains forward operating sites across at least 19 locations in the Middle East, with eight permanent bases including in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. As a result, political neutrality inevitably collides with the reality of logistical and technical involvement.
The escalation between the United States and Iran has exposed the limits of traditional Gulf neutrality. Gulf states must now balance deterrence and diplomatic efforts to protect their sovereignty and infrastructure while avoiding being drawn into a wider confrontation. That is an almost impossible balance to maintain when your airport is on fire and the missiles came from a country you never declared war on.
What the Model Was Never Designed to Handle
The strategic bargain at the heart of these arrangements is clear: host governments trade access for deterrence, training, technology, and political partnership, while Washington gains forward reach, logistics depth, and operational flexibility. That trade has historically been worth making. But it assumed a specific kind of conflict — one where the base’s deterrent function would prevent the host state from becoming a battlefield.
Iranian strikes caused damage at several sites tied to US military operations, including a key THAAD-related radar facility in Jordan and installations at the Fifth Fleet base in Bahrain. US military installations have also not prevented Iranian missiles from causing very real damage across the Gulf, potentially putting into question the rationale for hosting them.
Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, states are prohibited from using force inconsistent with the UN’s purposes. If military operations launched from host-nation territory are of contested legality — a live question in the Iran context — the host state faces a genuine legal dilemma. Lending territory for such operations could engage international responsibility under Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility, which addresses states that knowingly aid another in committing an internationally wrongful act.
That legal exposure is not theoretical. Spain’s refusal to allow the use of its jointly operated installations at Rota and Morón for American operations against Iran is not merely a diplomatic irritant — it is a stress test for many of the assumptions that have long gone unexamined in the architecture of Western security alliances. If a NATO member could draw that line, the question of whether Gulf states retain the same right becomes unavoidable.
It is likely that Gulf and Iranian diplomats are back-channeling on how to prevent further Iranian attacks on their territory. Such discussions likely center on the role and presence of US military infrastructure in the Gulf states. That conversation, held quietly, is the real strategic reckoning the region has been avoiding for thirty years. The missiles that hit Manama and Kuwait City may have finally made it unavoidable.
By ThinkTanksMonitor Editorial
