One month into the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, the six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) find themselves caught between a war they never wanted and a post-war order they desperately need to shape. When Iranian missiles slammed into Gulf capitals, they shattered more than glass and concrete — they also dealt a blow to the Gulf states’ carefully cultivated image as oases of stability, insulated from the region’s crises. From damaged airports in Kuwait to burning fuel tanks in Bahrain and smoke rising over Dubai’s skyline, the conflict has thrown decades of careful diplomatic hedging into disarray.
Iran’s decision to target the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the Gulf has had far-reaching consequences. These states prohibited the US and Israel from using their airspace for strikes against Iran, yet Tehran struck them anyway — a painful reminder that proximity to American military bases comes at a steep cost. Iran’s attacks on the Gulf have increased the perceived risks of housing US military bases at a time when Gulf states are also questioning the benefits of such bases.
The Hormuz Question
No issue captures the Gulf’s vulnerability more starkly than the Strait of Hormuz. This major maritime choke point for global energy trade has experienced ongoing disruption since February 28, after Iran launched retaliatory strikes and its IRGC issued warnings prohibiting vessel passage. Brent crude surpassed $100 per barrel on March 8 for the first time in four years, and the closure has been described as the largest disruption to the energy supply since the 1970s crisis.
The response has been swift. The UAE announced plans to deploy its naval forces and push for a multinational “Hormuz Security Force” to safeguard commercial shipping. The Royal Navy assumed operational command of a multinational naval coalition on March 25, with the task force comprising vessels from multiple allied nations. The fleet includes warships from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands. Whether this armada can reopen the strait without triggering a wider conflagration remains the defining security question of the crisis.
Diversifying Away from Washington
The war is accelerating a fundamental reassessment of Gulf security partnerships. One Gulf official acknowledged that “inadequate” American planning for Iran’s retaliation will lead to diversifying security partners rather than “overly relying on the US.” Gulf states cannot afford to sever ties with the United States, yet they also cannot comfortably maintain an alliance structure that exposes their security to decisions made beyond their borders.
This tension is already reshaping arms procurement. European defense tech startups are ramping up commercial discussions with Middle East governments since the Iran war. One CEO said interest from Gulf states was “skyrocketing” as they race to bolster counter-drone and missile defenses. Intra-Gulf collaboration is also picking up pace — in January 2026, the UAE’s EDGE Group and Qatar’s Barzan Holdings announced a strategic joint venture to co-develop advanced defense technologies.
Meanwhile, the Abraham Accords face a chill. While both the UAE and Bahrain indicated the war will help tighten ties with Israel, Gulf officials largely rejected speculation that it would lead to new Arab normalization deals. Expanding the Accords is now unlikely to advance in other Gulf countries, especially as Riyadh insists that progress on Palestinian statehood must precede normalization. Trump urged Saudi Arabia to join at the FII summit in Miami last week, but the appeal landed amid deep Gulf frustration over being dragged into a conflict not of their choosing.
Shaping the Endgame
The US has sent Iran a 15-point plan to end the war, even as Trump approves the deployment of more troops to the region. According to several Middle Eastern officials, the plan offers extensive sanctions relief in return for the removal of all enriched uranium, limits to Tehran’s ballistic missile program, and cessation of support to militant groups including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas. Iran has rejected the proposal, according to state-run Press TV, though the White House suggests “talks continue.”
The Gulf monarchies want a seat at this table, but Washington appears content to dictate terms. During the conflict, even senior diplomats and security officials in allied countries reportedly found themselves outside key decision-making circles, learning about major operations through media reports — reinforcing the Gulf perception that opaque American decision-making threatens their direct interests.
Still, the post-war period will offer openings. The death of Ali Khamenei triggered an election for a new supreme leader, with an Interim Leadership Council established on March 1. The slow unraveling of the regime will create space for Gulf capitals — especially Riyadh, which arguably stands to benefit the most from a weakened Iran — to exercise influence over whatever regional order emerges. The war has created a “Zeitenwende moment” for the Gulf monarchies, marking the end of their policy of strategic hedging. How they respond — whether by deepening ties with Europe, demanding genuine consultation from Washington, or building autonomous defense capacity — will define the Middle East’s security architecture for a generation.
Original analysis inspired by Joshua Yaphe from The National Interest. Additional research and verification conducted through multiple sources.
