Recent drone strikes targeting Khartoum’s main airport and military bases have sharpened concerns across the Horn of Africa. Sudan’s regular army accused Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates of orchestrating the May attacks, a charge both governments denied even as they face claims of supporting rival Sudanese factions. These exchanges coincide with fresh turmoil in northern Ethiopia, where a faction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) moved to reinstate its control over Tigray province, directly challenging the 2022 peace agreement. Such developments reveal how the region’s overlapping crises are feeding off each other, creating pathways for conflict to spread rapidly across borders.
For years, Sudan and Ethiopia have engaged in a shadow conflict by backing each other’s internal opponents. Khartoum has sheltered Tigrayan fighters and allowed some to join operations against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Ethiopian authorities, for their part, host training sites for Sudanese paramilitaries. A Crisis Group analysis describes this as a situation where both capitals feel besieged, with limited bandwidth to manage external relations while fighting domestic battles.
Shifting Loyalties and Ethnic Ties
Eritrea’s role has grown particularly unpredictable. After joining Ethiopian forces in the 2020–2022 Tigray war — during which its troops were linked to widespread abuses catalogued by Human Rights Watch — Asmara now appears to tilt toward the TPLF and Sudanese army elements. This pivot stems partly from Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s repeated references to his country’s landlocked status as a “historical mistake,” which Eritrean leaders interpret as a threat to their Red Sea coastline. Eritrea has hosted training for Sudanese militias from border communities that share linguistic and family bonds with groups inside Eritrea.
Should fighting reignite in Tigray, these connections could activate quickly. Fighters currently aligned with Sudanese forces might cross back to defend kin in Eritrea or Tigray, pulling Khartoum deeper into the fray. At the same time, Ethiopian support for the RSF and allied groups has enabled new offensives in Sudan’s Blue Nile region. Investigative tracking has highlighted training camps inside Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, moves that could destabilize Sudan’s eastern regions in the coming months regardless of what happens further north.
The Next Critical Theater
Sudanese experts expect eastern Sudan to emerge as the next major theater, especially as the dry season approaches and Ethiopia deepens its backing for the RSF. The combination of proxy backing and local grievances makes de-escalation difficult. Yet direct confrontation between Sudanese and Ethiopian state forces remains improbable in the near term. Both leaderships are consumed by their own survival struggles.
A recent meeting in Djibouti between Ethiopian officials and a senior Sudanese vice president offered a modest sign that channels remain open. Historical patterns suggest the two nations have often stepped back from the edge. Still, the current environment differs sharply from previous eras. As analysts have noted in recent commentary, cooler heads no longer dominate regional decision-making in the way they once did.
The potential fallout extends across the Red Sea region. Renewed large-scale fighting would displace hundreds of thousands more, compound famine risks in Sudan, and invite greater involvement from Egypt, Gulf states, and others with stakes in Nile waters or maritime routes. African Union mediators and concerned international actors face an urgent task: addressing the root drivers of mistrust, from resource access to accountability for past crimes. Failure to do so could transform today’s proxy skirmishes into tomorrow’s full-blown regional war.
Original analysis inspired by Mat Nashed from The New Arab. Additional research and verification conducted through multiple sources.
