A month into the war, the word “negotiations” appears constantly — in Trump’s Truth Social posts, in statements from Pakistan’s foreign office, in carefully worded communiqués from Oman and Egypt. Yet the gap between the language of diplomacy and its substance has rarely been wider. While Trump claims Iran is desperate to negotiate, Iranian officials maintain they have no intention of engaging in formal talks, despite messages being exchanged through intermediaries. Both governments are performing diplomacy while prosecuting a war. Understanding why requires going back to before the first bombs fell.
The current impasse is all the more striking given how close the two sides once were. Just before the strikes began on February 28, Omani foreign minister Badr Al-Busaidi said a “breakthrough” had been reached, with Iran agreeing never to stockpile enriched uranium and to full IAEA verification. Al-Busaidi said peace was “within reach.” After the US and Israel attacked Iran, Al-Busaidi said he was dismayed and that “active and serious negotiations” had been undermined.
That pre-war process had not been seamless. US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff said Iran had begun recent nuclear talks by insisting on its “inalienable right” to enrich uranium; separately, diplomats with knowledge of the talks said Witkoff himself undermined negotiations by misrepresenting the key exchange and misunderstanding Iran’s offer to suspend enrichment for several years. A Gulf diplomat cited in The Guardian alleged that intermediaries Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were acting as “Israeli assets” in an attempt to provoke a military confrontation. Whatever the truth, the result was a war launched while diplomatic channels were still open — a fact that now poisons every subsequent exchange.
Two Incompatible Definitions of “Negotiation”
The core problem today is that Washington and Tehran don’t just disagree on terms. They disagree on what negotiation means under these conditions. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told state media Iran had no intention of holding talks with the United States, and clarified that an exchange of messages via mediators “does not mean negotiations.” On March 25, Iran rejected the US 15-point proposal through intermediaries and presented five conditions of its own: an end to attacks on Iran and pro-Iranian forces, mechanisms to prevent the resumption of war, compensation for damages, and international recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.
From Tehran’s perspective, the US proposal demands that Iran disarm itself of the very tools that have given it any leverage in this conflict. Foreign Affairs argues the White House is making a mistake by tying ceasefire negotiations to a grand bargain; the US proposal reportedly covers zero nuclear enrichment, missile restrictions, and an end to Iran’s support for regional armed groups — conditions that analysts say must be negotiated after the bombs stop falling, not as preconditions. It is described as fantasy to think Iran will agree to restrict its missile capability during a war in which such weapons have proved to be its main tool of retaliation.
Iran’s wartime calculus is therefore not about rejecting diplomacy outright. A source told Iran’s Fars news agency that Iran intends to realize its strategic goals in the war first, and only when that happens will there be a possibility of ending the conflict. For Tehran, accepting Washington’s terms now would lock in the current power asymmetry — a settlement that formalizes defeat rather than ending a war.
Trump’s Narrowing Options
Trump faces his own trap. As recently as last Friday, Trump said “you don’t do a ceasefire when you’re literally obliterating the other side.” Three days later, after what he described as conversations with a mystery official in Tehran, he declared “they want to settle, and we’re going to get it done.” On March 26, he posted on Truth Social that he was “pausing the period of Energy Plant destruction by 10 Days” — citing an Iranian government request.
That extension revealed more than Trump intended. A president who had tied American credibility to reopening the Strait of Hormuz and disciplining Iran found himself granting Tehran a ten-day reprieve at Tehran’s request. Iran’s control over the strait allows it to exert enormous influence on global energy markets, giving Tehran bargaining power; meanwhile, Trump’s incentive to find a resolution is counterbalanced by geopolitical and operational risks, creating tension between urgency and strategic caution.
The mediator landscape has grown crowded but not necessarily more effective. Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Oman are all involved in negotiation efforts, aimed at both reaching a ceasefire and securing safe passage for ships through the strait. US officials have nonetheless soured on third-party mediators, saying the experience with Oman before the war had clearly not worked and that direct negotiations, if they can be started, are far more efficient. The question of who would give final sign-off for Iran on a deal is also unresolved — the health status of new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is unknown, and his inexperience in high-level diplomacy raises further doubts about his role.
Why the Deadlock Holds
Unless both sides make genuine concessions, the deadlock will continue — and the US-Israeli killing of high-level Iranian officials makes a ceasefire significantly more challenging than it was in the June 2025 war. Although Israel consistently hoped for regime change, the war has instead led to the rise of a more hardline military elite; the assassination of Khamenei elevated his son Mojtaba, who is closely aligned with parts of Iran’s security apparatus that take a more confrontational stance toward Washington.
Trump has predicted the US will be done with the conflict “within maybe two weeks,” saying he had “one goal: They will have no nuclear weapon and that goal has been attained” — without explaining how he reached that conclusion. Meanwhile, Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf rejected the ongoing negotiations on March 29, saying Iran could not be forced into submission — the same day Trump told reporters the talks were going well and Iran had agreed to most American demands.
That gap — between Trump’s optimism and Tehran’s public defiance — is the clearest measure of where things stand. Both governments are speaking for their domestic audiences as much as for each other. Until the cost of continuing exceeds the cost of conceding for both sides simultaneously, the performance of diplomacy will continue to run alongside the reality of war.
Original analysis inspired by Mahdi Niksefat Motlagh from Middle East Monitor. Additional research and verification conducted through multiple sources.
