Washington is reopening direct contact with Myanmar’s military backed government after years of trying to isolate its leaders over the 2021 coup and widespread human rights abuses. The Trump administration has now held at least two rounds of talks with officials representing President Min Aung Hlaing, including meetings in Naypyidaw and Tokyo. US officials say practical concerns such as criminal scam centers are part of the discussions, but Reuters has also linked the talks to American interest in Myanmar’s rare earth deposits. That creates an uncomfortable question for US foreign policy: how far should competition with China reshape Washington’s approach to an authoritarian government?
Myanmar matters because the global mineral supply chain remains heavily concentrated in China. US Geological Survey data show Myanmar was the world’s fourth largest producer of rare earths in 2024, responsible for about 7.1 percent of global output. Around 27,000 metric tons of its rare earth production went to China that year. At the same time, China still controls processing for about 87 percent of the world’s rare earth supply, including all recorded processing of strategically important dysprosium and terbium.
Minerals Complicate Washington’s Myanmar Policy
That concentration explains why the United States is searching aggressively for alternative suppliers. Rare earth elements are essential for advanced electronics, electric vehicles and military systems, making dependence on Chinese processing a strategic vulnerability. Washington has already invested heavily in domestic mineral production, yet recent analysis shows China retaining dominant positions across several critical mineral supply chains.
Myanmar appears attractive on paper, but accessing its resources would be far more difficult than signing an agreement with the government. Much of the country’s rare earth extraction is concentrated in Kachin State. The US Geological Survey reports that significant production there is controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation rather than Myanmar’s central authorities. Any American strategy that assumes the government in Naypyidaw can simply grant access to these deposits risks misunderstanding the fragmented reality created by civil war.
The diplomatic cost is easier to identify. Min Aung Hlaing became president in April after a military dominated parliament elected him following elections widely criticized by opponents of military rule. He remains under American sanctions. Washington’s own Burma legislation requires sanctions against senior military figures involved in the coup and human rights abuses, while the policy framework explicitly links those measures to restoring civilian government.
Congress may therefore become an important obstacle to any rapid normalization. The House passed the bipartisan BRAVE Burma Act in February, which would strengthen sanctions and extend their duration. The legislation advanced to the Senate after lawmakers argued that Washington should continue supporting democratic forces rather than ease pressure on the military leadership.
Engagement Arrives During a Humanitarian Crisis
The policy shift is taking place while conditions inside Myanmar remain severe. The United Nations estimates that 16.2 million people require humanitarian assistance and nearly 3.8 million were internally displaced by mid 2026. Fighting continues across multiple regions, while military air attacks remain a major threat to civilians.
In September, an airstrike near a crowded market in Rakhine State killed at least 49 people and injured dozens more, according to local authorities and the Arakan Army. Such attacks make renewed international engagement particularly valuable to Myanmar’s government because diplomatic meetings can help weaken the isolation imposed after the coup.
The United States is not alone in reconsidering its approach. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim recently backed efforts toward Myanmar’s eventual reintegration into ASEAN, although he said meeting Min Aung Hlaing did not amount to formal recognition of his government. Other regional states are also balancing opposition to military rule against practical concerns about migration, security and trade.
Washington has legitimate reasons to diversify critical mineral supplies and communicate with governments it opposes. But rare earth competition does not erase the political meaning of diplomatic recognition. If closer ties develop without measurable concessions on political prisoners, civilian protection or democratic rule, Myanmar’s generals could gain international legitimacy while Washington receives little guaranteed access to the minerals it wants. The strategic challenge is therefore not choosing between human rights and resources, but avoiding a policy that sacrifices the first without securing the second.
Original analysis inspired by Steve Bloomfield from The Guardian. Additional research and verification conducted through multiple sources.
