Iraq’s political system operates within a geometry defined by foreign pressure, sectarian division, and institutional weakness. When Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani unexpectedly withdrew his candidacy for a second term, his departure signaled not a normal leadership transition, but a recalibration of forces in which internal Iraqi politics have become secondary to regional and international competition. The emergence of Nuri al-Maliki as a successor candidate crystallizes these tensions, forcing a confrontation between U.S. demands, Iranian interests, and Iraq’s fragile sectarian balance.
Sudani’s decision to step aside appears tactically calculated rather than spontaneous. For two years, he attempted to balance contradictory demands: American insistence on curbing Iran-aligned factions, and domestic political realities rooted in Shia-led coalitions with deep Iranian ties. Remaining in power would have required severing relationships with constituencies that view the State of Law Coalition—Maliki’s political vehicle—as essential to Shia interests. This choice would constitute political suicide within Iraq’s sectarian framework.
Instead, Sudani withdrew, effectively passing responsibility for confronting U.S. demands to a successor. His gamble operates on multiple levels: another political deadlock might restore him with international blessing as a stabilizing figure, or a technical extension of his caretaker authority could buy time until regional tensions—oscillating between negotiation and potential wider conflict—reach resolution. This calculated retreat demonstrates how external constraints force Iraqi leaders to employ complex, indirect strategies rather than direct confrontation.
The Maliki Factor: Regional Leverage and Historical Baggage
Maliki’s re-emergence as a viable candidate has alarmed Washington. When President Trump publicly attacked his candidacy via social media—a post later deleted—the message was unmistakable: Maliki represents a “forbidden zone” in U.S. policy toward Iraq. The deletion itself was strategic, allowing Maliki space to demonstrate alignment with American demands while preserving deniability for both sides.
Maliki’s history complicates his candidacy. During his previous tenure as prime minister (2006-2014), his government’s sectarian policies—marginalization of Sunni populations, centralization of military command, and proximity to Iranian influence—contributed to institutional fragmentation. His administration’s initial failures in confronting the Islamic State created the vacuum that allowed ISIS to capture large portions of Iraq in 2014. Yet he remains politically significant because he combines military expertise with demonstrated capacity to manage Baghdad’s complex power dynamics.
The current moment presents Maliki with an opportunity to reposition himself. He signals willingness to centralize weapons control, curb financial channels benefiting Iran, and confront corruption—positions designed to address American security concerns. Whether these assurances will overcome historical skepticism remains uncertain; Washington’s deep suspicions of Maliki reflect not merely current policy, but accumulated experience with his previous governance patterns.
The Sectarian Divide: Kurdish Support, Sunni Resistance
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has privately and publicly signaled support for Maliki’s candidacy. The KDP’s calculus is straightforward: they view Maliki as a “strong partner” capable of fulfilling financial obligations to the Kurdish Region and managing Baghdad’s complex power structure. The KDP has deliberately extended the timeline for electing a new president, creating space for Maliki to consolidate Shia support and negotiate with Washington.
Conversely, Sunni political leaders—particularly Mohammed al-Halbousi and his allied factions—oppose Maliki’s return. This resistance reflects historical grievance: Maliki’s previous administration marginalized Sunni communities, launched judicial prosecutions targeting Sunni figures, and concentrated power in Shia-dominated institutions. Sunni leaders fear that Maliki’s return would resurrect an era of sectarian polarization that could destabilize the delicate national balance.
This divide between Erbil’s welcome and Anbar’s resistance places Maliki in an impossible position: reassuring a wary Sunni spectrum while capitalizing on Kurdish support requires credibility he no longer possesses. His previous tenure demonstrated a pattern of sectarian favoritism; expectations that he has fundamentally changed his governance philosophy lack empirical foundation.
U.S. Military Retrenchment and Iraq’s Exposed Flanks
The strategic landscape has shifted significantly in Iraq’s disfavor. The U.S. has withdrawn forces from major bases in federal Iraq and exited Syria, while concentrating military presence in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. This repositioning marks a fundamental redefinition of American security commitments: large portions of Iraqi territory no longer receive direct U.S. air cover or intelligence support.
This withdrawal coincides with heightened regional tensions, rendering the Syrian-Iraqi border a critical vulnerability. The relocation of U.S. power to Iraqi Kurdistan effectively converts the region into Washington’s primary “observation deck” over a volatile landscape while leaving Baghdad with reduced capacity to project authority. The central government’s sovereignty is strained precisely when regional competition intensifies.
The ISIS Detainee Crisis and Security Collapse Risk
Iraq has received thousands of ISIS detainees transferred from Syrian prisons as Damascus reasserts control over its territory. These individuals—housed in Iraqi facilities—represent a catastrophic security risk if institutional controls break down. A potential Maliki government would assume responsibility for managing this radicalized population without the direct U.S. intelligence and military backing that previously contained them.
The scenario echoes 2014, when inadequate security at detention facilities contributed to mass escapes that reignited ISIS operations. Without sustained U.S. presence and cooperation, Iraqi security forces lack capacity to prevent similar breaches. Sunni-majority provinces remain vulnerable to renewed ISIS recruitment and mobilization if Baghdad loses credibility with local populations.
Regional Powers’ Calculations: Tehran’s Bargaining Chip
In Iran’s strategic calculus, Maliki functions as a valuable pressure card in negotiations with Washington. His nomination alone generates sufficient concern among U.S. policymakers to create leverage. The most plausible Iranian scenario involves ultimately withdrawing support for Maliki’s candidacy at a crucial moment, presenting this as a meaningful regional concession to the Trump administration in exchange for progress on nuclear or broader geopolitical issues.
This dynamic demonstrates how individual candidates become reduced to instruments in great-power competition. Maliki’s fate depends less on Iraqi political processes than on bargaining between Washington and Tehran.
Economic Uncertainty and Gulf Investment Risk
Maliki’s candidacy introduces serious economic uncertainty. Capital from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait—recently reviving Iraq’s economy through real estate, energy, and infrastructure investments—seeks stability and international acceptance. Any confrontation with Washington or renewed sectarian polarization could freeze these projects indefinitely. Iraq cannot afford to lose Gulf confidence; without it, the nation remains exposed to oil volatility and rent-dependent economic patterns.
Turkey’s Expanded Leverage and Regional Coordination
The transformation in Syria under Turkish sponsorship has reshaped Iraq’s western neighborhood. The rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Muhammad al-Julani) as Syria’s new strongman, coupled with Turkish military presence, creates a new security equation. Ankara now controls critical “valves” in this geopolitical space, including the PKK withdrawal to Qandil Mountains, water resources, and border crossing commerce.
Maliki would face Turkish demands for security coordination on PKK operations and Kurdish separatism. Turkey has demonstrated willingness to replicate its Syrian model—bilateral security agreements linking Ankara, Damascus, and Baghdad—potentially paving the way for cross-border energy and infrastructure projects. This would test Maliki’s flexibility within a shifting regional balance.
Constitutional Deadlines as Political Theater
Iraq’s constitution contains legal deadlines for leadership transitions that have become “advisory texts” threatened by political consensus and partisan interest. Three scenarios now appear likely: installation of Maliki despite U.S. rejection (15 percent probability, carrying extreme risk of security and economic rupture), replacement with a U.S.-aligned consensus figure (65 percent, reflecting most probable outcome), or extension of Sudani’s caretaker authority (20 percent, buying time for regional clarification).
Conclusion: Fragmented State, Competing Powers
Iraq stands in a state of “organized confusion,” as one analyst observed. Maliki’s candidacy crystallizes the fundamental contradiction in contemporary Iraqi politics: internal decision-making remains subordinate to external balance. The coming weeks will determine whether Maliki can navigate these constraints or whether his return becomes the catalyst for fractioning Iraq further and entangling it deeper in regional and international conflict.
Original analysis by Abutalib Albohaya, The Cradle (February 2026). Restructured and expanded by ThinkTanksMonitor.
