The recent adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 marks a significant diplomatic victory for the Trump administration, formally endorsing the “20-point plan” for Gaza.1 However, the transition from diplomatic text to reality faces a potentially insurmountable hurdle: the refusal of major Arab powers to engage in “peace enforcement” against Hamas. While the resolution authorizes an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to secure the enclave, the reluctance of regional allies to deploy troops in a combat environment threatens to derail the initiative before boots hit the ground.
The ‘Peace Enforcement’ Dilemma
The core obstacle to forming the ISF lies in the distinction between peacekeeping—monitoring a truce with the consent of all parties—and peace enforcement, which involves imposing order on hostile actors.2 King Abdullah II of Jordan recently articulated this regional anxiety, warning that no nation is willing to send its soldiers into a combat zone to disarm entrenched militants.3
Speaking to international media, the Jordanian monarch emphasized that while training support is on the table, running patrols with weapons inside Gaza is a red line for Arab states. The concern is that without Hamas’s consent to disarm, any international force would immediately become a combatant, effectively fighting Israel’s war by proxy. This hesitation has created a vacuum where the “Board of Peace,” established by the resolution to oversee reconstruction, lacks the security muscle required to operate.
Struggling to Assemble a Coalition
Despite the diplomatic breakthrough in New York, the practical assembly of the ISF has stalled. Washington has reportedly struggled to secure firm troop commitments from its traditional Arab security partners. Major regional players like Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have signaled they will not contribute forces under current conditions, fearing domestic backlash and the prospect of a quagmire.4
In the absence of these key allies, the administration has been forced to look further afield. Reports indicate that negotiations are underway with nations such as Indonesia and Azerbaijan to provide the bulk of the manpower. However, these potential contributors have expressed wariness about the rules of engagement. Even more telling of the recruitment difficulties are reports suggesting overtures have been made to the government of Yemen—an entity itself struggling with internal legitimacy—highlighting the scarcity of willing partners.
Hamas Rejection and the Threat of Renewed War
The viability of the ISF is further compromised by the hostile stance of Hamas. Following the Security Council vote, the group explicitly rejected the resolution’s disarmament clauses.5 By declaring that it would treat any international force mandated to disarm the resistance as an occupying power, Hamas has effectively threatened war against the ISF.
This rejection neutralizes the “peacekeeping” premise of the mission. Unlike the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon, which operates under a (theoretically) cooperative framework, the ISF would enter Gaza as a hostile entity in the eyes of the de facto local power. Analysts warn that this dynamic risks triggering a new international conflict, pitting peacekeepers from Muslim-majority nations against Palestinian militants—a geopolitical nightmare that few governments are willing to risk.
The UN Framework and Diplomatic Fault Lines
The passage of Resolution 2803 was achieved only after intense maneuvering, with Russia and China ultimately abstaining rather than vetoing the US-drafted text. The resolution formally creates the “Board of Peace” as a transitional authority and annexes the Trump administration’s 20-point plan.6 US officials, including Ambassador Mike Waltz, have championed the move as a historic step toward dismantling terror infrastructure and ensuring security.
However, the exclusion of Turkey from the proposed force—reportedly due to Israeli objections over Ankara’s pro-Hamas rhetoric—further limits the pool of capable troop contributors. With the United Kingdom and other Western powers urging full implementation but offering limited boots on the ground, the burden falls disproportionately on nations with less expeditionary experience.
Conclusion
The Trump administration’s vision for a post-Hamas Gaza relies heavily on the assumption that an international force can succeed where the Israeli military has struggled: in the complete disarmament of the strip. Yet, without the participation of neighboring Arab militaries or the consent of local factions, the ISF risks becoming a symbolic entity unable to fulfill its mandate, or worse, a new belligerent in a protracted war. The ghosts of past peacekeeping failures in the Middle East loom large, suggesting that a “Board of Peace” on paper may not translate to peace on the ground.
Original analysis inspired by Con Coughlin from Gatestone Institute. Additional research and verification conducted through multiple sources.
