Trump administration’s demand for excluding sanctioned groups from Iraq’s next government intensifies Washington-Tehran competition following November 11, 2025 parliamentary elections that certified December 14 with 56% turnout—substantially higher than 2021’s 41%. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition won 46 seats, while Shi’a-led Coordination Framework emerged as largest bloc with approximately 165 seats in 329-member parliament, positioning government formation as battleground for Iranian and American influence.
State Department spokesperson stated to Al-Monitor that Washington prioritizes dismantling Iran-backed militias: “The composition of the Iraqi government is a matter for Iraqis, and only Iraqis, to decide. The United States has and will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of disarming and dismantling Iran-backed militias that undermine Iraq’s sovereignty, threaten Americans and Iraqis, and pilfer Iraqi resources for Iran.”
Sanctioned Entities in Current Government
Multiple sanctioned or designated entities operate within Iraqi government structures. Current Higher Education Minister Naeem al-Aboudi represents Sadiqoun, political arm of designated Iran-backed militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which won 27 seats in November election. Popular Mobilization Commission chairman Falih al-Fayyadh was sanctioned by US in 2021 for alleged human rights abuses. Current displacement and migration minister Evan Faeq Yakoob represents Babylon Movement, whose leader Rayan al-Kildani was sanctioned in 2019 on similar grounds.
Washington Institute analysis documented that US-designated terrorist organizations hold nearly 10% of new parliament seats, with approximately 51 seats controlled by explicitly pro-Iranian militia parties maintaining direct organizational and ideological ties to Tehran. This consolidation represents “legitimacy laundering” as militias translate battlefield dominance into parliamentary influence.
Strategic Context and Regional Setbacks
James Jeffrey, former US ambassador to Iraq and Washington Institute distinguished fellow, emphasized US concern over overtly pro-Iran figure becoming prime minister: “The US has other fish to fry in the region, in Lebanon, Syria and particularly Gaza, and an Iranian reconstitution of weapons on the horizon. But on the other hand, they realize they’ve succeeded in securing a huge strategic victory against Iran in the last two years. They don’t want to see Iraq become the place where that starts to be reversed.”
Iran experienced strategic setbacks since late 2023 Gaza war: Assad regime fall in Syria December 2024, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s killing by Israel September 2024, and damage sustained during 12-day June 2025 Israel-Iran war. These developments increased Iraq’s geopolitical importance as Iran reportedly transferred advanced missiles and UAVs to loyal Iraqi militias preparing for potential renewed confrontation.
Jeffrey identified US priorities with next Iraqi premier: maintaining minimal troop presence, respecting contracts with American companies, and ensuring Kurdistan Region oil flow. However, Iran possesses “cards to play” through gas exports—29% of Iraqi electricity generated by Iranian gas in 2023 according to Atlantic Council—and large religious tourism flows, enabling Tehran to “put Iraq under pressure” given Iran “has no problem squeezing people.”
Government Formation Dynamics
Moshe Dayan Center analysis documented four major groupings within Shi’a bloc: explicitly pro-Iranian militia parties (51 seats), al-Sudani and aligned parties (approximately 70 seats), al-Maliki faction (28 seats), and nearly eliminated “Tishreenis” representing 2019-2020 protest movement. This fragmentation creates opportunities and constraints—while Shi’a parties possess theoretical parliamentary majority, Iraqi political tradition and consociational democracy logic preclude exclusively Shi’a cabinet.
Al-Sudani’s November 18 decision joining Coordination Framework proved contentious. He justified the move as pragmatic effort forming largest parliamentary bloc to facilitate negotiations, framing it as responsibility completing his envisioned project rather than personal ambition. However, many Framework members actively oppose his candidacy for second term.
Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s party formally nominated him November 22 as premiership candidate, establishing him as al-Sudani’s primary competitor. As major power broker, al-Maliki represents formidable obstacle to al-Sudani’s re-election ambitions despite electoral success.
US Pressure Mechanisms and Leverage
Victoria Taylor, Atlantic Council Iraq Initiative director and former State Department official, stated Framework leaders will likely “identify a prime minister acceptable to both the United States and Iran,” noting “broad consensus among Shiite political leaders in support of Iraqi foreign policy that balances between US and Iran.” However, Trump administration’s confrontational posture toward Iran makes tacit Washington-Tehran agreement difficult, potentially prolonging government formation.
Trump administration applied pressure throughout 2025 including foreign terrorist designations in October. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce criticized August parliamentary bill that would have integrated Popular Mobilization Forces into state security apparatus: “We support genuine Iraqi sovereignty, not legislation that turns Iraq into an Iranian satellite state.” The Iraqi government tabled the bill later in August.
Jeffrey noted US possesses escalation options, referencing previous Trump administration’s partial 2019 embassy withdrawal from Baghdad. However, pushing Iraq too far carries risks given strategic importance: “There are a lot of sunk costs. Iraq is a truly important country.”
Prime Ministerial Candidates and Iranian Proximity
Multiple figures emerged as premiership contenders: intelligence chief Hamid al-Shatri, Basra Governor Assad al-Eidani, national security adviser Qasim al-Araji, plus al-Sudani, former Premier Haider al-Abadi, and former Premier Mustafa al-Kadhimi.
Araji, though not sanctioned, maintains particularly close Iranian ties. He helped broker 2023 Iraq-Iran agreement confronting Iranian Kurdish border groups and was arrested by US forces in 2007 for alleged weapons smuggling after serving in Badr during Iran-Iraq War. Coordination Framework includes Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali (sanctioned 2019), cleric Ammar al-Hakim, Iran-backed Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri, and al-Abadi. Maliki enjoyed friendly Iranian ties during 2006-2014 premiership.
Iraqi Leadership Balancing Act
Middle East Institute analysis emphasized election will not crown winner in US-Iranian rivalry but “set rules for next season of competition.” If electoral outcome produces familiar governing coalition, expect “more paperwork than pyrotechnics, more bureaucratic choreography than bold reform, and no fundamental shift in Iraq’s strategic alignment.”
Jeffrey stated Iraqi leaders will attempt pleasing both Iran and US during government deliberations, fearing chaos otherwise: “They know Iraqi interests don’t always coincide with the Iranians. They’ve seen what a disaster Hezbollah has been for Lebanon. They’ll try not to piss off the Iranians and not piss us off.”
Washington Institute documented al-Sudani’s 2022-2025 term brought relatively good years for Iraq-US relations. Despite solicitude toward Iran-backed coalition partners, he balanced problematic behavior and improved Washington ties. He canceled Trump arrest warrant from January 2020 Qasem Soleimani killing, refused signing PMF Law formally institutionalizing militias, and welcomed American companies including ExxonMobil, Chevron, and KBR signing major 2025 energy deals after long abstaining from Iraqi projects.
However, if Coordination Framework asserts will tilting Baghdad toward Tehran, relations could revert to first Trump administration’s “bad old days when Iraq was literal battleground between Iran and United States, and American companies wanted little to do with the country.”
Original reporting by Adam Lucente from Al-Monitor. Republished with additional research and verification by ThinkTanksMonitor.
