Ahmed al-Sharaa’s November 10 White House meeting with President Trump—the first Syrian presidential visit to Washington since independence—delivered tangible diplomatic victories including UN Security Council sanctions removal and six-month Caesar Act suspension. Yet translating international recognition into domestic consolidation proves complicated as Kurdish forces resist integration, Druze leaders demand autonomy, and Israeli military expansion threatens southern Syria.
Sanctions Relief Advances Despite Congressional Conditions
Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced Caesar Act suspension alongside clarifications from Treasury and Commerce departments regarding exemptions and permissive activities. Damascus joined the Global Coalition Against ISIS as its 90th member, though emphasizing political component rather than military arm Operation Inherent Resolve participation. Trump praised Sharaa as doing “very good job so far” while pledging to “do everything we can to make Syria successful.”
Most significantly, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast softened opposition to permanent repeal following meetings with Sharaa, though insisting on reimposition clauses if obligations fail. The House subsequently passed Caesar Act repeal 312-112 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act, with Senate action expected before Christmas.
Repeal includes monitoring requirements: 180-day reviews over four years confirming Damascus combats ISIS, removes foreign fighters from senior positions, protects minorities, refrains from unjustified military action against neighbors, prosecutes human rights violators, and stops narcotics trafficking. Senator Lindsey Graham’s amendment suggests reimposing sanctions after two consecutive failed certifications—non-binding language nonetheless raising Trump administration concerns about investor hesitation.
Syrian officials characterized sanctions removal as essential for reconstruction following conflict estimated to require $216 billion according to World Bank assessments—nearly ten times Syria’s pre-war GDP. Syrian central bank Governor Abdulkader Husrieh called relief “a miracle,” reflecting economic desperation driving diplomatic outreach.
Kurdish Integration Stalls Despite March 10 Agreement Endorsement
Syrian Democratic Forces leadership reacted with suspicion to Washington discussions involving Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi expressed disappointment over Sharaa’s White House invitation without parallel Kurdish leadership reception, voicing concerns about trilateral agreements undermining SDF interests. Abdi pledged expediting “SDF integration into Syrian state institutions” following U.S. Envoy Tom Barrack’s demands for “practical steps,” yet cautioned about needing “international partners”—implicit reference to American and French support rather than Damascus authority.
The fundamental dispute involves constitutional framework preceding disarmament. Abdi emphasized unresolved issues: “constitution and form of government—centralized or decentralized—are fundamental issues” requiring agreement before comprehensive settlement. Damascus strategy outlined by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani proposes SDF integration under U.S. supervision parallel to coalition accession—offering Washington face-saving disengagement pathway without addressing Kurdish political demands for federal arrangements.
Competition escalated through Shammar tribal sheikh engagement. Sharaa received Mani’ al-Jarba on November 19—whose al-Sanadid Forces constitute SDF unit backbone—undermining Kurdish claims to Arab tribal representation east of Euphrates. Al-Jarba diplomatically briefed Abdi three days later, yet tensions manifested through clashes in Maadan desert east of Raqqa and renewed front-line confrontations in Deir ez-Zor.
Turkish President Erdogan initially adopted conciliatory tone following Washington meetings, expressing readiness ensuring March 10 agreement success. Yet Fidan quickly reverted to hardline stance, describing “current SDF structure as direct threat to Turkey’s security” requiring removal of threats east of Euphrates—signaling Ankara’s integration timeline expectations differ from Damascus gradualism.
Druze Tensions Complicate Southern Syria Stabilization
Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri reiterated independence demands for Suwayda governorate alongside international genocide recognition for July massacres. Clashes erupted immediately before and after Sharaa’s Washington trip between government forces and National Guard—Druze faction coalition under Hijri leadership. Hijri demands release of 600+ kidnapped Druze alongside government withdrawal from villages beyond administrative borders enabling displaced returns.
Jordanian-facilitated dialogue proposals focusing on “Syrian unity and disarmament” encountered Hijri rejection, though internal Druze divisions emerged as dissenting voices advocating “national rescue path” gained prominence following Sharaa’s international legitimacy boost. Syrian government hardened positions by November 15, labeling Druze factions “rebel gangs” while preparing legal action against Hijri for undermining state security.
New conditions proposed November 21 suggested Suwayda residents manage security collaborating with Damascus without pursuing independence, integrating National Guard as distinct reformed army unit with local leadership while relocating internal security forces from specific areas and protecting residents from reprisals. Hijri awaits Syrian-Israeli relations evolution before potentially accepting compromises—recognizing his argument about Damascus “extremism” weakened by UN sanctions removal and White House reception demonstrating international acceptance.
Israeli Military Expansion Threatens Security Agreement Framework
Netanyahu initially questioned whether Sharaa would purge jihadist elements, stabilize Syria, cooperate on demilitarized zone establishment and ensure Druze community safety. Israel reaffirmed intentions maintaining buffer zone and Mount Hermon occupation while UN reports indicated expanding military presence. Jerusalem halted discussions following Damascus insistence on Israeli withdrawal agreements from territories occupied post-Assad—Israel maintaining control pending formal “peace” conclusion.
Netanyahu’s provocative visit to occupied Syrian territory drew Sharaa administration rejection. Netanyahu described Druze as “allies” emphasizing Israel’s protection commitment and threat prevention with or without agreements. Russian military delegation visited Quneitra governorate potentially reviving roles per 2018 Southern Agreement, prompting Israeli warplane squadron patrols signaling determination preventing military deployments.
November 28 Beit Jann operation against “Islamic Group” resulted in ambush killing 20+ Syrians and injuring 13 Israeli soldiers. Israel accused Sharaa administration orchestrating ambush—reinforcing security agreement refusal by citing withdrawal security risks and Damascus inability maintaining order. Israeli officials expressed dissatisfaction with Sharaa’s ISIS coalition membership, growing U.S.-Syrian counterterrorism coordination, and “regional security” arrangements potentially receiving limited American backing. Most infuriating: Turkish Foreign Minister participation in Washington meetings discussing “eliminating Israeli threats to Syria.”
Conclusion: Legitimacy Without Consolidation
Sharaa secured international recognition transforming from designated terrorist to White House guest within year. Yet diplomatic achievements translate unevenly domestically. Kurdish integration negotiations stall over constitutional questions Damascus avoids addressing. Druze autonomy demands persist despite government pressure leveraging international legitimacy against Hijri. Israeli military expansion proceeds regardless of American security agreement mediation attempts.
Trump appears willing giving Sharaa opportunity demonstrating peace progress while Netanyahu seeks constraining Syrian leadership ensuring adherence to Israeli security priorities. This divergence between American conditional engagement and Israeli maximalist demands creates space for Damascus maneuvering yet complicates comprehensive stabilization. Sharaa’s trip strengthened regional standing through U.S. acknowledgment yet domestically incentivizes power consolidation against opponents rather than national reconciliation—pattern potentially linking Caesar Act repeal to minority protection commitments some lawmakers already propose.
Original analysis inspired by Emirates Policy Center research. Additional research and verification conducted through multiple sources.
